Timor review

BOOK REVIEW by Andy Alcock: “THE LONG PATROL – AUSTRALIA & EAST TIMOR’S WARS” by Richard Plunkett (Black Dog Books 2008) $16.95
Since Timor Leste gained its independence in 1999, it seems that there is a never ending stream of books being written about the country. This is probably the case because not many thought that East Timor would
win against the Indonesian military – even those that supported its independence. The author identifies why this might be the case when early in his introduction, he states:

“There’s something about the little guy eventually winning against a bully that appeals to me..”

At the independence celebrations in Dili on 20 May 2002, the then Secretary – General of the UN, Kofi Annan,

when congratulating the East Timorese and praising their resistance, stated that the UN personnel assisting the East Timorese to gain their freedom had been one of the most popular exercises undertaken by the world body.

For those who have not read much about Timor, this is a very good book to start. Richard Plunkett has managed to give the reader a very good overview of the various key phases of the Indonesian military (TNI) occupation and the betrayal of western countries – especially Australia. eg

* the civil war between UDT and FRETILIN

* the early TNI incursions including the murder of 5 western journalists at Balibo

* the various strategies adopted by the TNI and the FALANTIL and RENETIL resistance

* the key massacres perpetrated by the TNI

* Australia’s reluctant role to force the TNI out after the massacres following the referendum for independence in 1991

He also provides some very important historical background. eg

* the support given by the East Timorese to Australian commandos during World War 2

* the end of European colonialism after World War 2

* Indonesia’s struggle for independence

* political changes in Portugal and its colonies that led to the Carnation Revolution and the overthrow of the Salazar/Caetano fascist dictatorship

* the influence of the Cold War on events in Indonesia and East Timor

This is a book that would be particularly useful for secondary students. Plunkett’s writing style is very easy to follow; he has highlighted many quotes from key people and he has included good maps and a very useful
bibliography, a glossary, a timeline and an index.

Overall, I found this book to be an excellent read. It does include some minor mistakes, however, in terms of dates of some of the key events. My greatest criticism, though is the author’s approach to the issues of the Cold War and the Indonesian background. I think that he could have devoted some more space to these important issues.
Plunkett refers to the TNI major argument for invading was that there were a few left wingers in FRETILIN.

I felt this arguement could easily be countered by mentioning that at the time, there were also many left wingers in the ALP. This could not seriously have been used as an argument for the TNI to invade Australia and was a very weak argument. Nevertheless, it was parrotted bymany Indonesian apologists and conservative politicians in both of Australia’s major political parties. so why do so many give credence to this argument?

Another TNI argument that should have been challenged is that they intervened because of thge civil war in East Timor.
As Richard Plunkett states in his book, pro FRETILIN forces had essentially defeated UDT within 10 days of theUDT commencement of hostilities (10 August 1975). When Indonesia began its invasion in October 1975, the civil war had been over by about 2 months.
In the Indonesian background, Plunkett does not mention that many Australian soldiers also fought alongside Indonesian partisans during World War 2. These were the backbone of Indonesia’s resistance against the Dutch
military when it returned to reclaim its colony. I think that it is important to be aware that both Sukarno and Suharto fought with the Imperial Japanese Army against the Allies.
Many Indonesians believe that they would not have achieved their independence had it not been for those Australian soldiers, who gave them assistance during the fight against Japanese fascism and supported the early work of the Indonesian independence activists. Then, between 1945 – 49, members of the Australian union movement maintained bans on materials being sent to Indonesia by the Dutch government in its attempt to crush Indonesia’s independence movement. When Suharto overthrew Sukarno in 1965, many of its victims in the first year of the dictatorship, apart from
Balinese, Chinese, PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) members, trade unionists, members of human rights groups etc. were those Indonesians who fought alongside Australian soldiers. Amnesty International claimed that between half to a million people died in 1965. Many Indonesians say the figure is nearer 3 million.
I thought it a little disappointing that there was no mention of the role of the CIA in Suharto’s 1965 coup. This agency gave the names of thousands of political activists to the military so that they could eliminate them. To understand Suharto’s Indonesia, it is important to raise the fact that his dictatorship was a client state of the USA – both for military purposes and for access to regional resources. This also raises questions about the TNI brutality and corruption in other parts of the region apart from East Timor. Who exploits the resources and the local people and who benefits from the
exploitation? Some clear examples are West Papua, Acheh and Malaku (the Moluccas).

If younger generations are to understand the key problems in our region of the world, any analysis needs to critically examine these aspects of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor.

Subscribe

Subscribe to our e-mail newsletter to receive updates.

2 Responses to Timor review

  1. Richard Plunkett September 22, 2009 at 8:52 pm #

    Hi Chris,

    Thanks for the positive review of the book. I realise a few typos and errors crept into the book – the final week before publication was sheer mayhem. Such is life.
    A few points on your critique – I would have loved to write more on the background but having exceeded the word limit by about 7,000 words (an extra 20%) I felt I had pushed the publisher as far as they would go on including extra material.
    I broadly agree that the invasion pretext that Fretilin was a hotbed of leftwing radicalism was not much more than a pretext. Australia and Indonesia had already decided East Timor should not become independent, so any pretext would do.
    I think the book does challenge TNI propaganda that they intervened in 1975 because of the Fretilin/UDT civil war – might have to disagree on this point.
    As for adding more info on the role of Australians in the Indonesian resistance during WW2, to be honest I barely knew about this. So that’s all my fault.
    Regarding coverage of the events of 1965, I didn’t feel it was sufficiently related to East Timor to add more information. There is a link of course in explaining the background of the Indonesian leadership that chose to invade, but again word limits prevented a fuller description. Same goes with the CIA link to the 1965 putsch.
    As for Suharto’s Indonesia being a US client state, I suppose I played down this angle because to some degree I feel this argument lets the Indonesians responsible for the invasion off the hook. Suharto and Beni Murdani should not evade any liability because the regime was a US ally. There is a tendency among some writers to argue the East Timor invasion was a US-led conspiracy for strategic reasons (e.g. to get oil from the Timor Sea or to protect submarine routes through the Ombai Strait). I think it is more likely that the US didn’t care much at all about East Timor, and that the idea to invade was an Indonesian one. The idea that Indonesia absorb East Timor seems to have been an Australian one – an ongoing diplomatic disaster for Australia once the use of violence by Indonesia to achieve this goal became apparent. The US approved the invasion but otherwise don’t seem to have played a major role. Just my opinion though.

  2. Andy Alcock September 30, 2009 at 11:32 am #

    Hi Richard

    Thanks for your comments on my review and congratulations on a good book..

    I understand the problem with keeping the contents of an article or a book within limits as I usually have articles and letters I prepare cut (and editors often tend to cut out the parts you think are crucial!)

    The CIA assisted Suharto & his murdering mates in the 1965 coup quite strongly for the reasons I mentioned in the review.

    The US wanted a client state in the region. I think you are probably correct that the invasion of East Timor was an Indonesian one and that several Australian leaders were happy to go along with it for reasons of the cold war ideology, the lopsided trade between Indonesia and Australia
    and to stay on side with US interests.

    It appears that Suharto was not very keen on the idea, but many TNI generals did.

    However, former US president, Gerald Ford, and former US Secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, dined with Suharto on the eve of the TNI’s full scale invasion of East Timor. I think they did nothing to deter Suharto from going ahead with the invasion was that they wanted to maintain good relations with the dictatorship for the same reasons previous US leaders aided and abetted the 1965 coup.

    later, Kissinger was very angry when it was revealed that he and Ford had dined with Suharto at such a strategic time.

    Then there is the issue of West Papua. In the early 1960s, US leaders insisted that WP should become part of Indonesia, knowing full well that the people were Melanesians and not Asians. Of course, there were also resources in WP that the US were very interested in eg Freeport copper.

    I think that the Australian involvement in fighting alongside Indonesian partisans to defeat Japanese fascism at the same time as Australian soldiers were being assisted by the East Timorese provides a great insight into the feelings of many ordinary Australians. I visited Indonesia in 1974 and was surprised to know that we were considered very warmly by ordinary Indonesians for the assistance during WW2 and the Australian union solidarity for 4 years after the war which they believed was crucial in achieving their independence.

    I think that history will condemn Suharto, Murdani and many other TNI generals for the invasion along with Australian and US leaders because of their complicity

    Warm regards

    Andy Alcock

Leave a Reply